Introduction
This paper estimates the causal effect of incapacitation on crime and breaks the simultaneity between crime and incarceration using a unique quasi-natural experiment, namely Italy's recurrent collective pardoning of up to 35 percent of the prison population. Levitt (1996) uses overcrowding litigation status to generate an exogenous variation in the US prison population, though only in rare occasions do judges release prisoners to alleviate overcrowding. In the absence of actual releases the channel through which litigation is supposed to affect prison population in the short run is by influencing the inflows of prisoners (i.e. laxer police, fewer offenders sentenced to prison terms). Our instrument, on the contrary, generates immediate changes in prison population.
Due to collective pardons and amnesties 1 inmates with a residual sentence length of a given number of years, usually 2 or 3, are released. The last collective pardon has been passed in July 2006, and in less than a month 22,000 inmates (more than one third of the whole prison population) have been freed (DAP, 2006) . This policy, seen as a short term solution to prison overcrowding, generates a large variation in prison population.
Crime is likely to respond to collective pardons in three different ways. Since pardons reduce the expected sanction, everything else equal, we should expect crime to be higher in a society that every once in a while makes use of them (long term deterrence effect). Given the unavailability of a counterfactual Italian society without pardons, this effect is hard to estimate. Criminals might also try to strategically time their criminal activity in order to minimize their expected sanction, especially if the expected sentence length is similar to the usually pardoned sentence length (short term deterrence effect). For example, criminals might decrease their criminal activity immediately after a pardon, simply because the next pardon is likely to occur only after several years. Not controlling for this short term deterrence effect would certainly downward bias the estimate of the incapacitation effect, which represents the last way collective pardons might affect crime, that is by releasing potential criminals. This effect depends on the criminals' physical presence on the criminal scene. Most of the effect is likely to be driven by recidivists, but there might also be some spillovers.
One one hand, the increased supply of criminals might influence the probability of crime detection, and so attract new entrants on the criminal scene, while on the other hand released criminals might 1 In Italian these policies are called "Indulto" and "Amnistia" 3 drive some of the old criminals out of the market (Freeman, 1999) .
To evaluate how pardons affect crime it is also necessary to realize that they clearly are endogenous: increased crime rates may lead, if no new prisons are build, to prison overcrowding, which may lead to a collective release. A first way we deal with this endogeneity is to first difference the data.
It is less likely that yearly changes in crime lead to collective pardons. 2 The second way we deal with this endogeneity is by exploiting the national character of these pardons. Regional variation in crime and prison population allows us to identify the incapacitation effect dealing with both, the endogeneity of the policy and the deterrence effects. 3 The within-year between Italian regions fraction of pardoned inmates depends on the distribution of the residual sentence length and on the distribution of criminal types residing in a region, both of which are plausibly exogenous. Since controlling for time fixed-effects leaves little variation in our instrument, we also present estimates that control for time effects using two alternative semiparametric specifications: a national cubic spline based on three-year intervals and a pardon specific linear time trend. 4 In these cases the identification of the incapacitation effect is based on both, regional differences in the fraction of pardoned inmates (due to differences in the distribution of the residual sentence length), and discontinuities in changes in crime around the collective pardons. 5 Several papers have tried to estimate the effect of prison population on crime, though without separating incapacitation from deterrence. Marvell and Moody (1994) uses state-level panel data and, after rejecting that crime Granger causes prison population, estimates an elasticity of crime with respect to prison population of -0. 16. Spelman (1994) finds similar effects. Levitt (1996) controls for the simultaneity using an IV approach and finds elasticities that are 2 to 3 times larger.
Only few papers study the effect of pardons on crime. One reason for this is that most empirical research on the criminal justice system studies the US (Levitt and Miles, 2004) , and in the US pardons are rare. One exception is Mocan and Gittings (2001) , which estimates the deterrence effect of gubernatorial pardons of person on death row and finds that three additional pardons generate one to 1.5 additional homicides.
In Italy, despite the recurrent use of pardons, there is only one empirical study on the relationship between pardons and crime, carried out in 1978 (Tartaglione, 1978) . This study finds that after the 1954, 1959, 1966, and 1970 pardons national changes in crime tend to be above average. The exceptions are the 1963 one, where only one year was pardoned, and the 1969 one, which applied to certain crimes committed during student demonstrations. It also documents that pardoned inmates have a recidivism rate of 31.2 percent, which is not different from s 32.9 percent, the recidivism rate of prisoners that are released at the end of their term. Standard errors are not shown, so we don't know whether these differences are significant or not. The judges who worked on this pioneering study did not use regression methods, making it impracticable to analyze the link between prison population and crime, or to use regional variation in the fraction of released prisoners. There is also no attempt to value the monetary cost of the increased crime, or to separate the incapacitation effect from the total effect. Whenever the supply of criminals is inelastic, the incapacitation effect is directly linked to recidivism, and recidivism can also be estimated based on prisoners surveys (DiIulio and Piehl, 1991 , Peterson et al., 1980 , Piehl and Diiulio Jr, 1995 , Visher, 1986 . According to these surveys the number of non-drug related crimes committed per year is positively skewed, with the median close to 10 and the mean close to 140. This heterogeneity and the heterogeneity in the types of crime committed generate a distribution of criminal specific social costs. Abstracting from the deterrence effects, incarceration is optimal when the expected harm done by an offender in a period exceeds the perperiod cost of imprisonment (Shavell, 1987) . Pardons might, therefore, act as an imperfect screening device to free criminals whose social cost lies below the cost of incarceration, but without getting rid of the entire deterrence effect of incarceration. In spirit of this "selective incapacitation" the penal codex establishes that pardons and amnesties (art. 151) should not be given to recidivist, recurrent, and career criminals. Despite this law, in the 1990 and 2006 pardons and in the 1990 amnesty the legislator has decided to extend the benefits to these types of criminals. Moreover, due to the evidence that criminal activity decreases with age, the legislator has sometimes increased the number of pardoned years for older criminals (usually defined as being older than 65 or 70 years of age).
We find that changes in incapacitation that are driven by collective pardons and amnesties have a significant positive effect on changes in crime. Elasticities of crime with respect to prison population lie between 0 and 49 percent, with drug crimes, frauds, and bank robberies showing the largest responses. A preliminary cost benefit analysis of pardons compared to expanding the prison capacity seems to indicate that the latter should be preferred. Though we do believe that the cost of pardons and amnesties could significantly be reduced by using more selective procedures: keeping criminals who are more likely to recommit more socially costly crimes in jail.
Italy's General Collective Pardons and the Prison Population
Starting in 1992, collective amnesties and pardons are issued by the legislator with an absolute majority requirement of 2/3 (constitutional law n.6 of 1992). Before that year the President could issue them, but only after being mandated by the parliament with a simple majority requirement.
The main difference between amnesty and pardon is that amnesties eliminate both the sentence and the crime, as if it never happened, while pardons eliminate only part of the sentence. Given that for Italian prosecutors it is mandatory to investigate all felonies (art. 112 of the Constitution), pardons are usually followed by amnesties. 6 Otherwise, prosecutors would have to spend time and effort investigating pardoned crimes, even if it was impossible to actually punish the perpetrators.
Another difference between the two is that whenever the pardoned prisoner recommits a crime within five years, the commuted prison term gets added to the new term. Amnesties, instead, are permanent.
Both, pardons and amnesties have the effect of reducing the prison population. 7 8 Pardons and amnesties reduce also the number of arrestees who are subject to restrictive measures that are different 6 The 2006 pardon has been an exception to this rule. 7 The Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT) groups together pardoned and amnestied prisoners. 8 The grand majority of pardoned prisoners are convicted criminals, though some might be in preventive detention with an expected sentence that is below the maximum number of pardoned years. In 2006, for example, where the number of pardoned years was 3, 10.7 percent of the prisoners that have been freed were in preventive detention (Marietti, 2006). 6 from imprisonment, namely social work outside prison, semiliberty, and house arrest. Between 1975, the year in which these measures have been introduced in Italy, and 1995, 19 percent of apprehended criminals (or alleged criminals) were subject to these alternative measures. It has been shown that recidivism rates for these individuals are significantly lower (Santoro and Tucci, 2004) , and some of these individuals might commit crimes even while subject to these alternative measures. Nevertheless, changes in crime might in part be due to these additional pardoned individuals. Between WWI and today there have been more than a dozen pardons (mostly coupled with amnesties), and while they were mainly aimed at reconciling a politically divided nation, in more recent times their main goal is to reduce prison overcrowding. Figure 1 shows that the official prison capacity (measured as the number of beds per 100,000 residents) has been declining between 1960 and 1975, significantly reducing the cushion between the total prison population and the total capacity. Although 81 new prisons have been build between 1971 and 2003, during the same period 87 of them have been dismissed because obsolete (de Franciscis, 2003) . As a result between 1975 and 1991 prison capacity has been basically flat at almost 50 beds per 100,000 residents. Only in more recent times has capacity increased.
As a result of flat capacity and a steady increase in crime, in 1983 time prison population exceeds for the first time the "official" capacity, even if aggregated at the national level. 9 The 1986 pardon has been the first one to solve a dramatic situation of overcrowding. Partly because of the tougher majority requirements, 16 years have passed between the last pardon, in 2006, and the pardon before that. During the same period the prison population has triplicated from about 20,000 to 60,000, dropping to about 35,000 after the last pardon. 10 Figure 2 shows the log changes in prison population and the fraction of pardoned prisoners. It is evident that collective pardons induce an almost one for one change in prison population. Overall the fraction of inmates that gets freed can be as high as 35 percent, and reaches sometimes 80 percent in single regions. But the effect appears to be short-lived. Within one year the inmate population recovers more than half of the size of the initial jump. Between 1959 and 1995 the inmate population increased on average by 449 inmates per year. Excluding the year of the pardons, year in which the inmate population decreases on average by 3,700 inmates, the year immediately after the pardon the 9 In case of necessity the prison administration can add new beds to existing cells, which lead them the definition of "tolerable" capacity. Unfortunately there are no data on capacity based on this definition. 10 No regional data are yet available for the 2006 pardon. As for how these pardons affect crime, ideally one would compare monthly crime level statistics with the number of pardoned criminals. Unfortunately the only data of this kind that is available to us are for bank robberies, and only with respect to the July 2006 pardon. Figure 3 The next section presents the other crime data that is used to measure how other types of crime respond to collective pardons and amnesties, this time those that have been passed between 1962 and 1995. We have chosen to collect information on crime and prison population up to 1995, because 1990 represents the last year in which a pardon gets passed for which these data are available.
Data
The Italian statistical office (ISTAT) publishes a yearly statistical supplement about the Italian judiciary system. From these supplements we collected information about the evolution of the prison crime statistics, those collected directly by the police corps (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) from people's complaints (Le Statistiche della Delittuosita' ), and those collected by the judiciary system (Le Statistiche della Criminalita' ) when the penal prosecution, which in Italy is mandatory, starts. The two statistics differ if the judiciary activity is delayed with respect to the time the crime has been committed, and every time crimes are reported to public officials who do not belong to the just cited police corps. Since the exact timing of our statistic is important in most of our analysis we use crime as measured by the police. When single crime categories are unavailable in the police data, and as a robustness check, we also use the judiciary statistics. 11 Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variable that we use. Between 1962 and 1995 there were an average of 42 inmates per 100,000 residents. During a similar time frame Levitt (1996) shows that in the US the inmate population is 168, exactly 4 times as large as in Italy. The total amount of crimes per year per 100,000 residents is 1,983. This number is significantly smaller then Levitt's number for the US (approximately 5,000), even though, unlike in our data, his classification scheme is hierarchical, it counts multiple-offense events as one, the most severe, criminal event. In 1984 ISTAT started separating reported crimes into more specific categories. Some categories are identical to the ones reported by Levitt, and allow a comparison between Italy and the US. Burglaries are less frequent in Italy (270 versus 1,200), and so are larcenies (200 versus 2700), though the definition and level of reporting of these crimes might differ as well. For motor vehicle thefts, where the definition is clear, and where underreporting and multiple offenses are less frequent, the two countries are similar: 317 per 100,000 residents in Italy and 402 in the US.
The Estimated Incapacitation Effect

Identification Strategy
We instrument changes in prison population with the number of pardoned prisoners to solve the simultaneity problem between prison population and crime. As said, crime might respond positively to expected future pardons (deterrence effect), as well as to past and current pardons (incapacitation effect). Criminals might change their criminal activity depending on whether they believe that a pardon is going to be issued in the near future. Fortunately, whenever pardons get enacted they only apply to crimes committed up to a specific date, usually three to six months before the signing of the law. The risk of committing a crime that is too close to a pardon, and is therefore excluded from the pardon, is likely to significantly reduce the incentive to commit pardonable crimes shortly before the law passes.
In order to isolate the incapacitation effect we need to realize that in Italy pardons are nationwide policies, and that the deterrence effect is, therefore, unlikely to vary across regions. A simple model can be used to formalize this intuition, and to lead to our empirical specification. Suppose criminal i at time t (the mass of criminals is normalized to one by dividing the number criminals by the regional population), ex-ante identical to all other criminals, faces the following problem
where the return from crime r i,t is, for simplicity, uniformly distributed between 0 and R, the joint probability of apprehension and conviction varies across regions, and the distribution of the disutility from jail J(S t ) depends on the expected sentence length, conditional on the information available up to time t, including information about possible future pardons.
Differences in the probability of apprehension and conviction are assumed to be temporary with mean E[p t,r ] = p t . Later in the empirical specification we deal with possible systematic differences by controlling for proxies of p, by differencing the data, and by controlling for regional fixed effects.
Information I does not vary across regions. The criminal is going to commit a crime if
In the simplified case of a sentence length of one year the law of motion of criminals is
It is possible to relax, in a reduced form approach, the assumption that sentence length S = 1.
If sentence length S is equal to two the model becomes
and after rearranging
Generalizing to sentence lengths up to duration S max :
Now let us introduce a pardon. The effect of pardoning Z years is to free W t,r criminals at the beginning of period t, 1 − ptJt R of which are going to recommit crimes during the year:
We allow the pardon to have an effect on future expected sentence lengthsJ t . The difference between the scenario with and without a pardon is going to bẽ
Notice that the number of criminals in a region varies because of the incapacitation effect (which varies because of differences in the actual realizations of p), and because of the deterrence effect.
Criminals might face changes in the deterrence effect ptJt R − ptJt R whenever the expected sentence length changes. This change influences the regional criminal population that is not incapacitated
We do not observe the counterfactual criminal scenario of a "pardon-year" without a pardon.
What we do in our empirical specification is to proxy for the counterfactual of crime using years that are contiguous to the pardon. If regional effects, time effects, and time-varying variables capture changes in the deterrence effect, then the coefficient on the number of pardoned prisoners captures the incapacitation effect 1 − ptJt R . Including year fixed effects the exogenous variation in the prison population that we exploit is the variation in the fraction of prisoners that are pardoned across regions at a given point in time.
This fraction depends on the distribution of the residual prison time of the inmate population, which at the time of the pardon is arguably exogenous. 12 13 Unfortunately, as will be clear once we show the first stages of our IV strategy not much variation in the number or the fraction of pardoned prisoners is left after controlling for year fixed effects. In order to approximate the evolution of the criminals' expectations without giving up all the national variation in pardoned prisoners we pursue two different solutions. In one specification we control for a cubic spline using three-year intervals, in the other we control for pardon-specific linear time trends. When we use splines we assume that criminals' changes in expectations evolve smoothly, without discontinuities. This might be either because the time constraints of the pardons effectively limit such discontinuities or because criminals simply do not take the pardon's timing into account.
Notice that the identification strategy is quite similar to a regression discontinuity approach. When we use pardon-specific linear trends we assume that criminals' expectations jump to a new level in the year of the pardon, but evolve linearly afterwards.
The different time controls are shown in Figure 3 Notice that variations in logs are more or less constant over time while variations in levels are increasing. This is due to the impressive increase in the total number of reported crimes ( Figure 1 ). Table 3 shows the fraction of pardoned inmates across regions. In 1963, year of the first pardon in our sample, in most regions only 20 percent of the prison population is pardoned. Table 4 shows that this corresponds to approximately 10 prisoners per 100,000 residents. Only three years later, in 1966, a new pardon gets passed that frees three times as many inmates. In the Abruzzo and Molise regions, aggregated because of data limitations, 85 percent of the inmate populations leaves jail.
The 1968 pardon instead, which applies to crimes committed during student demonstrations, only a "Competenza per Territorio, Article 8 of the Codice di Procedura Penale" (where the crime has been committed). Each region has one or more jurisdiction, with the exception of the Valle D'Aosta and Piedmont region who share the jurisdiction of Torino. In the analysis that follows were are implicitly assuming that criminals operate always inside the same region. There is, indeed, no clear evidence of criminal spillovers to contiguous regions, which suggest that criminals act locally. 
All regressions include regional fixed effects γ r , allowing for regional differences in systematic changes in the probability of apprehension and conviction, systematic changes in the labor market, etc. The Notice that the IV's reduced form equation in levels,
is directly related to equation 2. The term f (t) + γ r + δ ′ X t,r is supposed to capture the deterrence effect and isolate the incapacitation effect β = 1 − ptJt R . Not controlling for the deterrence effect could bias the estimated incapacitation effect downward. The reason is that post-pardon increases in expected sentence lengths are likely to reduce crime (it is optimal to increase criminal activity before the pardon and reduce it afterwards).
Given that some released prisoners get rearrested within a year, we would like to estimate how crime rates vary immediately after a pardon gets enacted. But pardons and amnesties are sometimes passed in the middle of the year, and we have no access to monthly regional data. Fortunately we can use the date the pardon gets passed to adjust the change in the prison population and the number of pardoned prisoners to produce "full-year equivalent" pardoned prisoners, that is prisoners who can potentially commit crimes for a whole year. Take, for example, the 1978 pardon. The law was issued on the 5th of August. Assuming that criminal activity is uniformly distributed over time after the pardon, recidivist prisoners would be able to commit crimes for 5 months in 1978. A way to take this timing into account and produce "full-year equivalent" prisoners is to reduce the number of pardoned prisoners by 7/12 in the year of the pardon and add these prisoners to the year after the pardon, year in which they can potentially commit crimes for the whole year. in all other years. We also adjust the prison population accordingly.
Results
Panel A of Table 5 percent for the model with pardon-specific linear time trends. It is comforting that the IV estimates that include year fixed effects are, although not precisely estimated, similar to the IV estimates that use pardon-specific linear trends, both in levels and in logs.
In Table 5 we additionally control for things that might affect pardons and crime rates. From now on we control for our preferred (and the more conservative) specification, the one that uses three-year cubic splines. Since some of the additional controls are available for the years 1985-1995 only, the sample size drops from 594 to 198. Changes in GDP are supposed to proxy for legal opportunities of criminals while changes in consumption are supposed to capture illegal opportunities. Controlling for these opportunities changes the reduced form elasticity (Table 5) Not all criminals are usually pardoned, usually some restrictions apply. Very violent crimes are generally excluded from pardons (see Table 1 ). Consistent with this selection, in Table 7 we find that between 1984 and 1995 types of crime that are explicitly excluded from pardons, like sexual assaults and kidnappings, do not show any significant increase related to pardons. 16 It is somehow 16 Mafia related homicides, always excluded from pardons, also do not respond to pardons. Since many regions have puzzling that larcenies and burglaries have an effect that is not significantly different from zero, though these crimes might be subject in the police data to serious measurement error. Motor-vehicle thefts, instead, that are known to be measured with high precision (the rates of reporting are close to one), have an elasticity of 20 percent. Bank robberies show an elasticity of 50 percent, and drug related crimes an elasticity of 60 percent, even if these were explicitly excluded from the 1990 pardon (though not from the 1990 amnesty).
As an additional robustness check, Table 8 shows that using judiciary crime data instead of police data only strengthen the incapacitation effect (30 percent versus 22 percent). Given that "judges for the initial investigation" (giudice delle indagini preliminari ) are supposed to dismiss all irrelevant cases before reporting a crime, this might be due to the gained precision in the measurement of crime.
Consistent with this possibility, the elasticity for thefts, which includes larceny and burglary, is now close to 40 percent and highly significant. Frauds show the highest elasticity (49 percent) and even the coefficient for murder and attempted murder is significantly different from zero (36 percent).
Policy Implications
In order to solve the problem of prison overcrowding, the important question is whether a forwardlooking society would benefit from building new prisons, or expand alternative measures to imprisonment, instead of constantly relying on pardons. Collective pardons and collective amnesties have been shown to increase the total number of crimes. What is left to see is whether the marginal social cost of these crimes is, when compared to the marginal cost of incarceration, large enough to make pardons an inefficient policy.
Let us start with the cost of incarceration. 17 Regressing the total budgetary cost of the peniten- 17 Notice that we are implicitly assuming a linear social function. In case of risk aversion individuals would like to equate marginal expected (dis)utility from crime with their marginal tax devoted to finance the prison administration. Given that crime involves risk, people should be willing to pay even more than the marginal cost of incarceration to keep criminals in jail. 20 median regression. Dividing the budget by the prison population instead, we get an average cost of 46,452 euros with a range that varies between 35,496 euros (97 euros per day) and 70,974 (194 euros per day). Overall the upper bar seems to be 70,000 euros. These numbers are two to three times larger than in the US, though this seems to be driven by the inmate-to-staff ratio, that is two to six times larger than in the US states. 18 Notice that these costs do not include tax distortions (it costs more than one euro to collect one euro in taxes), inmates' wasted human capital, their post-release decline in wages, and the pain and suffering of inmates and of their families (including the one due to overcrowding).
Calculating the marginal cost per crime is more difficult and requires the use of different sources and several assumptions. Table 9 reports the estimated elasticity (ǫ), the probability of reporting 20 The social cost of frauds comes from a study made by the Italian association of retailers (Con, 2006) . 2122 For drug related crimes we could not find any cost estimate, while for attempted murder, which also has a positive elasticity we use a conservative estimate of 0. Notice that when computing the total social cost, question marks are treated as zeros, a conservative approach.
For violent crimes we do not use quality of life reductions caused by pain and suffering, because no such estimates are available for Italy. The cost estimates also do not include preventive measures 18 At the beginning of 2007 the Italian prison system employed more than 45,000 people, with an inmate-to-staff ratio close to one (www.polizia-penitenziaria.it). In 2001 in the US the inmate-to-staff ratio ranged between 1.7 in Maine (with an average cost of 122 dollars per day) and 6.8 in Alabama (with an average cost of 22 dollars per day , www.ojp.usdoj.gov). 19 As in Levitt (1996) we need to assume that reported and unreported crimes are subject to the same elasticities, which, since criminals do not know a priori whether a crime gets reported or not, seems to be a reasonable assumption. 20 Estimates of the VSL for Italy range from 1,448,000 to 2,896,000 euros (Albertini and Scarpa, 2004) . See Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004b) and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004a) for an overview of recent estimates of the VSL. 21 The study uses the following sources for its estimate, fiscal police (Guardia di Finanza), customs police (Agenzia delle Dogane), survey data, and the anti-fraud phone (Telefono antiplagio). 22 We could not estimate some elasticities, marked with a question mark, while for other elasticities, based on institutional details of the pardons, we have a conservative guess of zero, marked with a zero and a question mark.
taken by people to fight crime (insurance policies and the like). Apprehensions are also socially costly, because resources must be spent to rearrest pardoned prisoners, but since these costs are difficult to be quantified they also are excluded.
Taken with the grain of salt given the assumptions, the total social cost amounts to 153,000 euros. The most socially costly crimes following a pardon are frauds (55,000 euros) and non-mafia related murders (46,000 euros). Motor vehicle thefts (a total of 31,000 euros), other thefts (14,000 euros) and bank robberies (8,000 euros) follow. This variability suggests that pardons do not select the type of criminals that are being released based on a cost minimizing principle. 23 Even if we exclude the social cost that is related to frauds, which is the only one that is not entirely based on representative victimization surveys or on police reports, the social cost is still significantly above the 70,000 threshold.
Up until now we have excluded pardoned individuals who are subject to alternative measures to detention from the cost benefit analysis. The reason is that we do not have region-level data on these measures. We do know, though that pardons affect the prison population and the population subject to alternative measures of detention in the same way. Since the population subject to alternative measures of detention is likely to recidivate less and cost less than the prison population, including them in the cost-benefit analysis is likely to reduce the marginal cost of imprisonment, making the case against pardons and amnesties even stronger.
Conclusions
We use an atypical judiciary policy, namely Italy's collective pardons and amnesties, to estimate the causal effect of incapacitation on crime. We show with a simple model that whenever pardons and amnesties are nationwide policies the incapacitation can be separately identified from the deterrence effect. We can also control for the possible endogeneity of the policy that arises whenever criminals expect a sentence-reducing policy before the policy gets enacted. Ignoring this endogeneity could bias our estimates toward zero. Compared to Levitt (1996) , which uses US States' overcrowding litigation status as an instrument and, therefore, is unable to control for expectations, or separate incapacitation from deterrence, our elasticities are only slightly smaller, and tend to be larger than previous "non-experimental" estimates (we show that our OLS estimates are also biased toward zero).
Collective pardons and amnesties could represent a more cost-efficient imperfect screening device than individual parole boards. This idea was certainly present in the mind of the legislator (at least before the 1990 pardon). "Formalized" habitual criminals were typically excluded from pardons, and elderly prisoners, believed to have lower recidivism rates, sometimes received larger sentence reductions.
This view could potentially lead to the definition of an optimal release policy, likely to be several times more efficient than the typical Italian pardon. We leave this to future research, and perform a cost-benefit analysis that compares the efficiency of pardons with the the status quo, i.e. keeping prisoners in jail. We find the social cost of pardons to be significantly larger than the cost of incarceration. In the absence of cost efficient alternatives measures to incarceration, this suggests that in Italy prison capacity should be increased. 
